Probabilistic Default Reasoning with Conditional Constraints by Lukasiewicz, Thomas
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
00
30
23
v1
  [
cs
.A
I] 
 8 
M
ar 
20
00
Probabilistic Default Reasoning
with Conditional Constraints
Thomas Lukasiewicz
Institut und Ludwig Wittgenstein Labor fu¨r Informationssysteme, TU Wien
Favoritenstraße 9-11, A-1040 Vienna, Austria
lukasiewicz@kr.tuwien.ac.at
Abstract
We propose a combination of probabilistic reasoning from
conditional constraints with approaches to default reasoning
from conditional knowledge bases. In detail, we generalize
the notions of Pearl’s entailment in system Z, Lehmann’s lex-
icographic entailment, and Geffner’s conditional entailment
to conditional constraints. We give some examples that show
that the new notions of z-, lexicographic, and conditional en-
tailment have similar properties like their classical counter-
parts. Moreover, we show that the new notions of z-, lexi-
cographic, and conditional entailment are proper generaliza-
tions of both their classical counterparts and the classical no-
tion of logical entailment for conditional constraints.
Introduction
In this paper, we elaborate a combination of probabilistic
reasoning from conditional constraints with approaches to
default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases. As a
main result, this combination provides new notions of en-
tailment for conditional constraints, which respect the ideas
of classical default reasoning from conditional knowledge
bases, and which are generally much stronger than the clas-
sical notion of logical entailment based on conditioning.
Moreover, the results of this paper can also be applied for
handling inconsistencies in probabilistic knowledge bases.
Informally, the ideas behind this paper can be described as
follows. Assume that we have the following knowledge at
hand: “all penguins are birds” (G1), “between 90 and 95%
of all birds fly” (G2), and “at most 5% of all penguins fly”
(G3). Moreover, assume a first scenario in which “Tweety is
a bird” (E1) and second one in which “Tweety is a penguin”
(E2). What do we conclude about Tweety’s ability to fly?
A closer look at this example shows that the statements
G1–G3 describe statistical knowledge (or objective knowl-
edge), while E1 and E2 express degrees of belief (or subjec-
tive knowledge). One way of handling such combinations of
statistical knowledge and degrees of belief is reference class
reasoning, which goes back to Reichenbach (1949) and was
further refined by Kyburg (1974; 1983) and Pollock (1990).
Another related field is default reasoning from conditional
knowledge bases, where we have generic statements of the
form “all penguins are birds”, “generally, all birds fly”, and
“generally, no penguin flies” in addition to some concrete
evidence as E1 and E2. The literature contains several differ-
ent approaches to default reasoning and extensive work on
the desired properties. The core of these properties are the
rationality postulates proposed by Kraus et al. (1990). These
rationality postulates constitute a sound and complete ax-
iom system for several classical model-theoretic entailment
relations under uncertainty measures on worlds. In detail,
they characterize classical model-theoretic entailment under
preferential structures (Shoham 1987; Kraus et al. 1990),
infinitesimal probabilities (Adams 1975; Pearl 1989), possi-
bility measures (Dubois & Prade 1991), and world rankings
(Spohn 1988; Goldszmidt & Pearl 1992). . They also char-
acterize an entailment relation based on conditional objects
(Dubois & Prade 1994). A survey of all these relationships
is given in (Benferhat et al. 1997). Recently, Friedman and
Halpern (2000) showed that many approaches describe to
the same notion of inference, since they are all expressible
as plausibility measures.
Mainly to solve problems with irrelevant information, the
notion of rational closure as a more adventurous notion
of entailment has been introduced by Lehmann (Lehmann
1989; Lehmann & Magidor 1992). This notion of entailment
is equivalent to entailment in system Z by Pearl (1990), to
the least specific possibility entailment by Benferhat et al.
(1992), and to a conditional (modal) logic-based entailment
by Lamarre (1992). Finally, mainly in order to solve prob-
lems with property inheritance from classes to exceptional
subclasses, the maximum entropy approach to default entail-
ment was proposed by Goldszmidt et al. (1993); the notion
of lexicographic entailment was introduced by Lehmann
(1995) and Benferhat et al. (1993); the notion of conditional
entailment was proposed by Geffner (Geffner 1992; Geffner
& Pearl 1992); and an infinitesimal belief function approach
was suggested by Benferhat et al. (1995).
Coming back to our introductory example, we realize
that G1–G3 and E1–E2 represent interval restrictions for
conditional probabilities, also called conditional constraints
(Lukasiewicz 1999b). The literature contains extensive
work on reasoning about conditional constraints (Dubois &
Prade 1988; Dubois et al. 1990; 1993; Amarger et al. 1991;
Jaumard et al. 1991; Tho¨ne et al. 1992; Frisch & Haddawy
1994; Heinsohn 1994; Luo et al. 1996; Lukasiewicz 1999a;
1999b) and their generalizations, for example, to probabilis-
tic logic programs (Lukasiewicz 1998).
Now, the main idea of this paper is to use techniques for
default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases in order
to perform probabilistic reasoning from statistical knowl-
edge and degrees of beliefs. More precisely, we extend
the notions of entailment in system Z , Lehmann’s lexico-
graphic entailment, and Geffner’s conditional entailment to
the framework of conditional constraints.
Informally, in our introductory example, the statements
G2 and G3 are interpreted as “generally, a bird flies with
a probability between 0.9 and 0.95” (G2⋆) and “generally,
a penguin flies with a probability of at most 0.05” (G3⋆),
respectively. In the first scenario, we then simply use the
whole probabilistic knowledge {G1,G2⋆,G3⋆,E1} to con-
clude under classical logical entailment that “Tweety flies
with a probability between 0.9 and 0.95”. In the second
scenario, it turns out that the whole probabilistic knowl-
edge {G1,G2⋆,G3⋆,E2} is unsatisfiable. More precisely,
{G1,G2⋆,G3⋆} is inconsistent in the context of a pen-
guin. In fact, the main problem is that G2⋆ should not be
applied anymore to penguins. That is, we can easily re-
solve the inconsistency by removing G2⋆, and then conclude
from {G1,G3⋆,E2} under classical logical entailment that
“Tweety flies with a probability of at most 0.05”.
Hence, the results of this paper can also be used for
handling inconsistencies in probabilistic knowledge bases.
More precisely, the new notions of nonmonotonic entail-
ment coincide with the classical notion of logical entailment
as far as satisfiable sets of conditional constraints are con-
cerned. Furthermore, they allow desirable conclusions from
certain kinds of unsatisfiable sets of conditional constraints.
We remark that this inconsistency handling is guided by
the principles of default reasoning from conditional knowl-
edge bases. It is thus based on a natural preference relation
on conditional constraints, and not on the assumption that
all conditional constraints are equally weighted (as, for ex-
ample, in the work by Jaumard et al. (1991)).
The work closest in spirit to this paper is perhaps the one
by Bacchus et al. (1996), which suggests to use the ran-
dom worlds method (Grove et al. 1994) to induce degrees
of beliefs from quite rich statistical knowledge bases. How-
ever, differently from (Bacchus et al. 1996), we do not make
use of a strong principle such as the random worlds method
(which is closely related to probabilistic reasoning under
maximum entropy). Moreover, we restrict our considera-
tions to the propositional setting.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We illustrate that the classical notion of logical entailment
for conditional constraints is not very well-suited for de-
fault reasoning with conditional constraints.
• We introduce the notions of z-entailment, lexicographic
entailment, and conditional entailment for conditional
constraints, which are a combination of the classical no-
tions of entailment in system Z (Pearl 1990), Lehmann’s
lexicographic entailment (Lehmann 1995), and Geffner’s
conditional entailment (Geffner 1992; Geffner & Pearl
1992), respectively, with the classical notion of logical
entailment for conditional constraints.
• We give some examples that analyze the nonmonotonic
properties of the new notions of entailment for default rea-
soning with conditional constraints. It turns out that the
new notions of z-entailment, lexicographic entailment,
and conditional entailment have similar properties like
their classical counterparts.
• We show that the new notions of z-entailment, lexico-
graphic entailment, and conditional entailment for con-
ditional constraints properly extend the classical notions
of entailment in system Z , lexicographic entailment, and
conditional entailment, respectively.
• We show that the new notions of z-entailment, lexico-
graphic entailment, and conditional entailment for condi-
tional constraints properly extend the classical notion of
logical entailment for conditional constraints.
Note that all proofs are given in (Lukasiewicz 2000).
Preliminaries
We now introduce some necessary technical background.
We assume a finite nonempty set of basic propositions
(or atoms) Φ. We use ⊥ and ⊤ to denote the propositional
constants false and true, respectively. The set of classical
formulas is the closure of Φ∪{⊥,⊤} under the Boolean
operations ¬ and ∧. A strict conditional constraint is an ex-
pression (ψ|φ)[l, u] with real numbers l, u∈ [0, 1] and clas-
sical formulas ψ and φ. A defeasible conditional constraint
(or default) is an expression (ψ‖φ)[l, u] with real numbers
l, u∈ [0, 1] and classical formulas ψ and φ. A conditional
constraint is a strict or defeasible conditional constraint.
The set of strict probabilistic formulas (resp., probabilis-
tic formulas) is the closure of the set of all strict condi-
tional constraints (resp., conditional constraints) under the
Boolean operations ¬ and ∧. We use (F ∨G), (F ⇒G),
and (F ⇔G) to abbreviate ¬(¬F ∧¬G), ¬(F ∧¬G), and
(¬(¬F ∧G))∧ (¬(F ∧¬G)), respectively, and adopt the
usual conventions to eliminate parentheses.
A probabilistic default theory is a pair T =(P,D), where
P is a finite set of strict conditional constraints and D is
a finite set of defeasible conditional constraints. A proba-
bilistic knowledge base KB is a strict probabilistic formula.
Informally, default theories represent strict and defeasible
generic knowledge, while probabilistic knowledge bases ex-
press some concrete evidence.
A possible world is a truth assignment I : Φ → {true,
false}, which is extended to classical formulas as usual. We
use IΦ to denote the set of all possible worlds for Φ. A pos-
sible world I satisfies a classical formula φ, or I is a model
of φ, denoted I |= φ, iff I(φ) = true.
A probabilistic interpretation Pr is a probability func-
tion on IΦ (that is, a mapping Pr : IΦ→ [0, 1] such that all
Pr(I) with I ∈IΦ sum up to 1). The probability of a classi-
cal formula φ in the probabilistic interpretation Pr , denoted
Pr(φ), is defined as follows:
Pr(φ) =
∑
I∈IΦ, I |=φ
Pr(I) .
For classical formulas φ and ψ with Pr (φ)> 0, we use
Pr(ψ|φ) to abbreviate Pr(ψ ∧ φ) /Pr(φ). The truth of
probabilistic formulas F in a probabilistic interpretationPr ,
denoted Pr |= F , is inductively defined as follows:
• Pr |= (ψ|φ)[l, u] iff Pr(φ)= 0 or Pr (ψ|φ)∈ [l, u].
• Pr |= (ψ‖φ)[l, u] iff Pr(φ)= 0 or Pr(ψ|φ)∈ [l, u].
• Pr |= ¬F iff not Pr |= F .
• Pr |= (F ∧G) iff Pr |= F and Pr |= G.
We remark that there is no difference between strict and
defeasible conditional constraints as far as the notion of truth
in probabilistic interpretations is concerned.
A probabilistic interpretation Pr satisfies a probabilistic
formula F , or Pr is a model of F , iff Pr |=F . Pr satisfies
a set of probabilistic formulas F , or Pr is a model of F ,
denoted Pr |= F , iff Pr is a model of all F ∈F . We say F
is satisfiable iff a model of F exists.
We next define the notion of logical entailment as fol-
lows. A strict probabilistic formula F is a logical conse-
quence of a set of probabilistic formulasF , denotedF |=F ,
iff each model of F is also a model of F . A strict condi-
tional constraint (ψ|φ)[l, u] is a tight logical consequence
of F , denoted F |=tight (ψ|φ)[l, u], iff l (resp., u) is the in-
fimum (resp., supremum) of Pr(ψ|φ) subject to all models
Pr of F with Pr(φ)> 0 (note that we canonically define
l=1 and u=0, when F |=(φ|⊤)[0, 0]).
We remark that every notion of entailment for conditional
constraints is associated with a notion of consequence and a
notion of tight consequence. Informally, the notion of con-
sequence describes entailed intervals, while the notion of
tight consequence characterizes the tightest entailed inter-
val. That is, if (ψ|φ)[l, u] is a tight consequence of F , then
[l′, u′]⊇ [l, u] for all consequences (ψ|φ)[l′, u′] of F .
Motivating Examples
What should a probabilistic knowledge base entail under a
probabilistic default theory? To get a rough idea on the re-
ply to this question, we now introduce two natural notions of
entailment and analyze their properties. It will turn out that
neither of these two notions is fully adequate for probabilis-
tic default reasoning with conditional constraints.
In the sequel, let T =(P,D) be a probabilistic de-
fault theory. We first define the notion of 0-entailment,
which applies to probabilistic knowledge bases of the
form KB =(ε|⊤)[1, 1]. In detail, a strict conditional con-
straint (ψ|φ)[l, u] is a 0-consequence of KB , denoted
KB ‖∼
0
(ψ|φ)[l, u], iff P ∪D |= (ψ|φ∧ ε)[l, u]. It is a tight
0-consequence of KB , denoted KB ‖∼0tight (ψ|φ)[l, u], iff
P ∪D |=tight (ψ|φ∧ ε)[l, u]. Informally, we use the con-
crete evidence in KB to fix our “point of interest” and the
generic knowledge in T to draw the requested conclusion.
That is, we perform classical conditioning.
We next define the notion of 1-entailment, which applies
to all probabilistic knowledge bases KB . A strict prob-
abilistic formula F is a 1-consequence of KB , denoted
KB ‖∼
1
F , iff P ∪D∪{KB} |= F . A strict conditional con-
straint (ψ|φ)[l, u] is a tight 1-consequence of KB , denoted
KB ‖∼
1
tight (ψ|φ)[l, u], iff P∪D∪{KB} |=tight (ψ|φ)[l, u].
Informally, we draw our conclusion from the union of the
concrete evidence in KB and the generic knowledge in T .
We now analyze the properties of these two notions of
entailment. Our first example concentrates on the aspects of
ignoring irrelevant information and property inheritance.
Example 1 The knowledge “all penguins are birds” and
“at least 95% of all birds have legs” can be expressed by
the following probabilistic default theory T1=(P1, D1):
P1 = {(bird | penguin)[1, 1]},
D1 = {(legs ‖ bird)[.95, 1]} .
Now, T1 should entail that “generally, birds have legs
with a probability of at least 0.95” (that is, e.g., if we know
that Tweety is a bird, and we do not have any other knowl-
edge, then we should conclude that the probability of Tweety
having legs is at least 0.95). Indeed, this conclusion is drawn
under both 0- and 1-entailment (see item (1) in Table 1).
Moreover, T1 should entail that “generally, yellow birds
have legs with a probability of at least 0.95” (as the property
“yellow” is not mentioned at all in T1 and thus irrelevant),
and that “generally, penguins have legs with a probability of
at least 0.95” (as the set of all penguins is a nonexceptional
subclass of the set of all birds, and thus penguins should
inherit all properties of birds). However, while 1-entailment
still allows the desired conclusions, 0-entailment just yields
the interval [0, 1] (see items (2)–(3) in Table 1). ✷
We next concentrate on the principle of specificity and the
problem of inheritance blocking.
Example 2 Let us consider the following probabilistic de-
fault theory T2=(P2, D2):
P2 = {(bird | penguin)[1, 1]},
D2 = {(legs ‖ bird)[.95, 1], (fly ‖ bird)[.9, .95],
(fly ‖ penguin)[0, .05]} .
This default theory should entail that “generally, penguins
fly with a probability of at most 0.05” (as properties of
more specific classes should override inherited properties of
less specific classes). Indeed, 0-entailment yields the de-
sired conclusion, while 1-entailment reports an unsatisfia-
bility (see item (7) in Table 1).
Moreover,T2 should entail that “generally, penguins have
legs with a probability of at least 0.95”, since penguins are
exceptional birds w.r.t. to the ability of being able to fly, but
not w.r.t. the property of having legs. However, 0-entailment
provides only the interval [0, 1], and 1-entailment reports
even an unsatisfiability (see item (5) in Table 1). ✷
The following example deals with the drowning problem
(Benferhat et al. 1993).
Example 3 Let us consider the following probabilistic de-
fault theory T3=(P3, D3):
P3 = {(bird | penguin)[1, 1]},
D3 = {(fly ‖ bird)[.9, .95], (fly ‖ penguin)[0, .05],
(easy to see ‖ yellow)[.95, 1]} .
This default theory should entail that “generally, yellow
penguins are easy to see”, as the set of all yellow penguins
Table 1: Examples of 0- and 1-entailed tight intervals.
T KB (ψ|φ) ‖∼
0
tight ‖∼
1
tight
(1) T1 (bird | ⊤)[1, 1] (legs|⊤) [.95, 1] [.95, 1]
(2) T1 (bird ∧ yellow | ⊤)[1, 1] (legs|⊤) [0, 1] [.95, 1]
(3) T1 (penguin | ⊤)[1, 1] (legs|⊤) [0, 1] [.95, 1]
(4) T2 (bird | ⊤)[1, 1] (legs|⊤) [.95, 1] [.95, 1]
(5) T2 (penguin | ⊤)[1, 1] (legs|⊤) [0, 1] [1, 0]
(6) T2 (bird | ⊤)[1, 1] (fly|⊤) [.9, .95] [.9, .95]
(7) T2 (penguin | ⊤)[1, 1] (fly|⊤) [0, .05] [1, 0]
(8) T3 (penguin ∧ yellow | ⊤)[1, 1] (easy to see|⊤) [0, 1] [1, 0]
(9) T4 (magpie | ⊤)[1, 1] (chirp|⊤) [.7, .8] [.7, .8]
(10) T5 (penguin∧ metal wings | ⊤)[1, 1] (fly|⊤) [0, 1] [1, 0]
(11) T2 (bird | ⊤)[.9, 1] ∧ (penguin | ⊤)[.1, 1] (fly|⊤) undefined [.86, .91]
(12) T2 (bird | ⊤)[.9, 1] ∧ (penguin | ⊤)[.9, 1] (fly|⊤) undefined [1, 0]
is a nonexceptional subclass of the set of all yellow objects.
But, 0-entailment gives only the interval [0, 1], and 1-entail-
ment reports an unsatisfiability (see item (8) in Table 1). ✷
The next example is taken from (Bacchus et al. 1996).
Example 4 Let us consider the following probabilistic de-
fault theory T4=(P4, D4):
P4 = {(bird |magpie)[1, 1]},
D4 = {(chirp ‖ bird)[.7, .8], (chirp ‖magpie)[0, .99]} .
This default theory should entail “generally, the proba-
bility that magpies chirp is between 0.7 and 0.8”, since we
know more about birds w.r.t. the property of being able to
chirp than about magpies. Indeed, both 0- and 1-entailment
yield the desired conclusion (see item (9) in Table 1). ✷
The following example concerns ambiguity preservation
(Benferhat et al. 1995).
Example 5 Let us consider the following probabilistic de-
fault theory T5=(P5, D5):
P5 = {(bird | penguin)[1, 1]},
D5 = {(fly ‖metal wings)[.95, 1], (fly ‖ bird)[.95, 1],
(fly ‖ penguin)[0, .05]} .
Assume now that Oscar is a penguin with metal wings. As
Oscar is a penguin, we should conclude that the probability
that Oscar flies is at most 0.05. However, as Oscar has also
metal wings, we should conclude that the probability that
Oscar flies is at least 0.95. As argued in the literature on
default reasoning (Benferhat et al. 1995), such ambiguities
should be preserved. Indeed, 0-entailment yields the desired
interval [0, 1], while 1-entailment reports an unsatisfiability
(see item (10) in Table 1). ✷
What about handling purely probabilistic evidence?
Example 6 Let us consider again the probabilistic default
theory T2 of Example 2. Assume a first scenario in which
our belief is “the probability that Tweety is a bird is at least
0.9” and “the probability that Tweety is a penguin is at least
0.1” and a second scenario in which our belief is “the prob-
ability that Tweety is a bird is at least 0.9” and “the proba-
bility that Tweety is a penguin is at least 0.9”. What do we
conclude about Tweety’s ability to fly in these scenarios?
The notion of 0-entailment is undefined for such purely
probabilistic evidence, whereas the notion of 1-entailment
yields the probability interval [.86, .91] in the first scenario,
and reports an unsatisfiability in the second scenario (see
items (11)–(12) in Table 1). ✷
Summarizing the results, 0-entailment is too weak, while
1-entailment is too strong. In detail, 0-entailment often
yields the trivial interval [0, 1] and is even undefined for
purely probabilistic evidence, while 1-entailment often re-
ports unsatisfiabilities (in fact, in the most interesting sce-
narios, as 1-entailment is actually monotonic).
Roughly speaking, our ideal notion of entailment for
probabilistic knowledge bases under probabilistic default
theories should lie somewhere between 0- and 1-entailment.
One idea to obtain such a notion could be to strengthen 0-
entailment by adding some inheritance mechanism. Another
idea is to weaken 1-entailment by handling unsatisfiabilities.
In the rest of this paper, we will focus on the second idea.
Probabilistic Default Reasoning
In this section, we extend the classical notions of entailment
in system Z (Pearl 1990), Lehmann’s lexicographic entail-
ment (1995), and Geffner’s conditional entailment (Geffner
1992; Geffner & Pearl 1992) to conditional constraints.
The main idea behind these extensions is to use the fol-
lowing two interpretations of defaults. As far as default
rankings and priority orderings are concerned, we interpret a
default (ψ‖φ)[l, u] as “generally, if φ is true, then the prob-
ability of ψ is between l and u”. Whereas, as far as notions
of entailment are concerned, we interpret (ψ‖φ)[l, u] as “the
conditional probability of ψ given φ is between l and u”.
Preliminaries
A probabilistic interpretationPr verifies a default (ψ‖φ)[l,u]
iff Pr(φ)= 1 and Pr |=(ψ|φ)[l, u]. It falsifies a default
(ψ‖φ)[l, u] iff Pr(φ)= 1 and Pr 6|=(ψ|φ)[l, u]. A set of de-
faultsD tolerates a default d under a set of strict conditional
constraints P iff P ∪ D has a model that verifies d. A set
of defaults D is under P in conflict with d iff no model of
P ∪D verifies d.
A default ranking σ on D maps each d∈D to a nonnega-
tive integer. It is admissible with T =(P,D) iff each set of
defaultsD′⊆D that is underP in conflict with some default
d∈D contains a default d′ such that σ(d′)<σ(d). A prob-
abilistic default theory T =(P,D) is σ-consistent iff there
exists a default ranking on D that is admissible with T . It is
σ-inconsistent iff no such default ranking exists.
A probability ranking κ maps each probabilistic interpre-
tation on IΦ to a member of {0, 1, . . .} ∪ {∞} such that
κ(Pr)= 0 for at least one interpretation Pr . It is extended
to all strict probabilistic formulas F as follows. If F is sat-
isfiable, then κ(F ) = min {κ(Pr) |Pr |= F}; otherwise,
κ(F ) =∞. We say κ is admissible with F iff κ(¬F ) =∞.
It is admissible with a default (ψ‖φ)[l, u] iff
κ((φ|⊤)[1, 1]) <∞ and
κ((φ|⊤)[1, 1]∧ (ψ|φ)[l, u])<κ((φ|⊤)[1, 1]∧¬(ψ|φ)[l, u]) .
Roughly speaking, the intuition behind this definition is to
interpret (ψ‖φ)[l, u] as “generally, if φ is true, then the prob-
ability of ψ is between l and u”. A probability ranking κ is
admissible with a probabilistic default theory T =(P,D) iff
κ is admissible with all F ∈P and all d∈D.
System Z
We now extend the notion of entailment in system Z (Pearl
1990; Goldszmidt & Pearl 1996) to conditional constraints.
In the sequel, let T =(P,D) be a σ-consistent probabilis-
tic default theory. The notion of z-entailment is linked to an
ordered partition ofD, a default ranking z, and a probability
ranking κz .
We first define the z-partition of D. Let (D0, . . . , Dk) be
the unique ordered partition ofD such that, for i = 0, . . . , k,
each Di is the set of all defaults in D −
⋃
{Dj | 0≤ j < i}
that are tolerated under P by D −
⋃
{Dj | 0≤ j < i} (note
that we define D −
⋃
{Dj | 0≤ j < i} = D for i=0). We
call this (D0, . . . , Dk) the z-partition of D.
Example 7 The z-partition for the probabilistic default the-
ory T2=(P2, D2) of Example 2 is given as follows:
({(legs ‖ bird)[.95, 1], (fly ‖ bird)[.9, .95]},
{(fly ‖ penguin)[0, .05]}) . ✷
We now define the default ranking z. For j = 0, . . . , k,
each d∈Dj is assigned the value j under z. The probabil-
ity ranking κz on all probabilistic interpretations Pr is then
defined as follows:
κz(Pr ) =


∞ if Pr 6|= P
0 if Pr |= P ∪D
1 + max
d∈D : Pr 6|=d
z(d) otherwise.
The following result shows that, in fact, z is a default
ranking that is admissible with T , and κz is a probability
ranking that is admissible with T .
Lemma 8 a) z is a default ranking admissible with T .
b) κz is a probability ranking admissible with T .
We next define a preference relation on probabilistic in-
terpretations. For probabilistic interpretations Pr and Pr ′,
we say Pr is z-preferable to Pr ′ iff κz(Pr)<κz(Pr ′).
A model Pr of a set of probabilistic formulas F is a z-
minimal model ofF iff no model of F is z-preferable to Pr .
We are now ready to define the notion of z-entailment
as follows. A strict probabilistic formula F is a z-con-
sequence of KB , denoted KB ‖∼ zF , iff each z-minimal
model of P ∪ {KB} satisfies F . A strict conditional con-
straint (ψ|φ)[l, u] is a tight z-consequence of KB , denoted
KB ‖∼
z
tight (ψ|φ)[l, u], iff l (resp., u) is the infimum (resp.,
supremum) of Pr(ψ|φ) subject to all z-minimal models Pr
of P ∪ {KB} with Pr(φ)> 0.
Coming back to Examples 1–6, it turns out that the non-
monotonic properties of z-entailment differ from the ones of
0- and 1-entailment (see Table 2).
In detail, in the given examples, z-entailment ignores ir-
relevant information, shows property inheritance to glob-
ally nonexceptional subclasses, and respects the principle
of specificity. Moreover, it may also handle purely proba-
bilistic evidence. However, properties are still not inherited
to more specific classes that are exceptional with respect to
some other properties. Moreover, z-entailment still has the
drowning problem and does not preserve ambiguities.
The following examples illustrate how z-entailed tight in-
tervals are determined.
Example 9 Given T2 of Example 2, we get:
(penguin | ⊤)[1, 1] ‖∼ ztight (legs | ⊤)[0, 1]
Here, the interval “[0, 1]” comes from the tight logical con-
sequence P2 ∪ {(fly ‖ penguin)[0, .05], (penguin | ⊤)[1, 1]}
|=tight (legs | ⊤)[0, 1]. ✷
Example 10 Given T5 of Example 5, we get:
(penguin ∧metal wings | ⊤)[1, 1] ‖∼ ztight (fly | ⊤)[0, .05] .
Here, the interval “[0, .05]” comes from the tight logi-
cal consequence P5 ∪ {(fly ‖ penguin)[0,.05], (penguin ∧
metal wings|⊤)[1, 1]} |=tight (fly | ⊤)[0, .05]. ✷
Lexicographic Entailment
We now extend Lehmann’s lexicographic entailment
(Lehmann 1995) to conditional constraints.
In the sequel, let T =(P,D) be a σ-consistent probabilis-
tic default theory. We now use the z-partition (D0, . . . , Dk)
of D to define a lexicographic preference relation on proba-
bilistic interpretations.
Table 2: Examples of z-, lexicographically, and conditionally entailed tight intervals.
T KB (ψ|φ) ‖∼
z
tight ‖∼
lex
tight ‖∼
ce
tight
(1) T1 (bird | ⊤)[1, 1] (legs |⊤) [.95, 1] [.95, 1] [.95, 1]
(2) T1 (bird ∧ yellow | ⊤)[1, 1] (legs |⊤) [.95, 1] [.95, 1] [.95, 1]
(3) T1 (penguin | ⊤)[1, 1] (legs |⊤) [.95, 1] [.95, 1] [.95, 1]
(4) T2 (bird | ⊤)[1, 1] (legs |⊤) [.95, 1] [.95, 1] [.95, 1]
(5) T2 (penguin | ⊤)[1, 1] (legs |⊤) [0, 1] [.95, 1] [.95, 1]
(6) T2 (bird | ⊤)[1, 1] (fly |⊤) [.9, .95] [.9, .95] [.9, .95]
(7) T2 (penguin | ⊤)[1, 1] (fly |⊤) [0, .05] [0, .05] [0, .05]
(8) T3 (penguin∧ yellow | ⊤)[1, 1] (easy to see |⊤) [0, 1] [.95, 1] [.95, 1]
(9) T4 (magpie | ⊤)[1, 1] (chirp |⊤) [.7, .8] [.7, .8] [.7, .8]
(10) T5 (penguin∧ metal wings | ⊤)[1, 1] (fly |⊤) [0, .05] [0, .05] [0, 1]
(11) T2 (bird | ⊤)[.9, 1] ∧ (penguin | ⊤)[.1, 1] (fly |⊤) [.86, .91] [.86, .91] [.86, .91]
(12) T2 (bird | ⊤)[.9, 1] ∧ (penguin | ⊤)[.9, 1] (fly |⊤) [0, .15] [0, .15] [0, .15]
For probabilistic interpretations Pr and Pr ′, we say Pr
is lexicographically preferable to Pr ′ iff there exists some
i∈{0, . . . , k} such that |{d∈Di |Pr |= d}|> |{d∈Di |
Pr
′ |= d}| and |{d∈Dj |Pr |= d}| = |{d∈Dj |Pr ′ |= d}|
for all i < j≤ k. A model Pr of a set of probabilistic for-
mulas F is a lexicographically minimal model of F iff no
model of F is lexicographically preferable to Pr .
We now define the notion of lexicographic entailment as
follows. A strict probabilistic formula F is a lexicographic
consequence of KB , denoted KB ‖∼ lexF , iff each lexico-
graphically minimal model of P ∪{KB} satisfies F . A strict
conditional constraint (ψ|φ)[l, u] is a tight lexicographic
consequence of KB , denoted KB ‖∼ lextight (ψ|φ)[l, u], iff l
(resp., u) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of Pr(ψ|φ) sub-
ject to all lexicographically minimal modelsPr ofP∪{KB}
with Pr (φ)> 0.
Coming back to Examples 1–6, it turns out that lexico-
graphic entailment has nicer nonmonotonic features than
z-entailment (see Table 2).
In detail, in the given examples, lexicographic entailment
ignores irrelevant information, shows property inheritance
to nonexceptional subclasses, and respects the principle of
specificity. Moreover, it does not block property inheritance,
it does not have the drowning problem, and it may also han-
dle purely probabilistic evidence. However, lexicographic
entailment still does not preserve ambiguities.
The following examples illustrate how lexicographically
entailed tight intervals are determined.
Example 11 Given T2 of Example 2, we get:
(penguin | ⊤)[1, 1] ‖∼ lextight (legs | ⊤)[.95, 1] .
Here, the interval “[.95, 1]” comes from the tight logical con-
sequence P2 ∪ {(legs ‖ bird)[.95, 1], (fly‖ penguin)[0, .05],
(penguin | ⊤)[1, 1]} |=tight (legs | ⊤)[.95, 1]. ✷
Example 12 Given T5 of Example 5, we get:
(penguin ∧metal wings | ⊤)[1, 1] ‖∼ lextight (fly | ⊤)[0, .05] .
Here, the interval “[0, .05]” comes from the tight logi-
cal consequence P5 ∪ {(fly ‖ penguin)[0,.05], (penguin ∧
metal wings|⊤)[1, 1]} |=tight (fly | ⊤)[0, .05]. ✷
Conditional Entailment
We next extend Geffner’s conditional entailment (Geffner
1992; Geffner & Pearl 1992) to conditional constraints.
In the sequel, let T =(P,D) be a probabilistic default
theory.
We first define priority orderings on D as follows. A pri-
ority ordering ≺ on D is an irreflexive and transitive binary
relation on D. We say ≺ is admissible with T iff each set
of defaults D′⊆D that is under P in conflict with some de-
fault d∈D contains a default d′ such that d′ ≺ d. We say T
is ≺-consistent iff there exists a priority ordering on D that
is admissible with T .
Example 13 Consider the probabilistic default theory
T2=(P2, D2) of Example 2. A priority ordering ≺ on D2
that is admissible with T2 is given by (fly ‖ bird)[.9, .95] ≺
(fly ‖ penguin)[0, .05]. ✷
The existence of an admissible default ranking implies the
existence of an admissible priority ordering.
Lemma 14 If T is σ-consistent, then T is ≺-consistent.
We next define a preference ordering on probabilistic in-
terpretations as follows. Let Pr and Pr ′ be two probabilis-
tic interpretations and let ≺ be a priority ordering on D. We
say that Pr is ≺-preferable to Pr ′ iff {d∈D |Pr 6|= d} 6=
{d∈D |Pr ′ 6|= d} and for each d∈D such that Pr 6|= d and
Pr
′ |= d, there exists some default d′ ∈D such that d ≺ d′,
Pr |= d′, and Pr ′ 6|= d′. A model Pr of a set of probabilistic
formulas F is a ≺-minimal model of F iff no model of F
is ≺-preferable to Pr . A model Pr of a set of probabilistic
formulas F is a conditionally minimal model of F iff Pr is
a ≺-minimal model of F for some priority ordering ≺ ad-
missible with T .
We finally define the notion of conditional entailment. A
strict probabilistic formula F is a conditional consequence
of KB , denoted KB ‖∼ ceF , iff each conditionally minimal
model of P ∪ {KB} satisfies F . A strict conditional con-
straint (ψ|φ)[l, u] is a tight conditional consequence of KB ,
denoted KB ‖∼ cetight (ψ|φ)[l, u], iff l (resp., u) is the infi-
mum (resp., supremum) of Pr(ψ|φ) subject to all condition-
ally minimal models Pr of P ∪ {KB} with Pr(φ)> 0.
Coming back to Examples 1–6, we see that among all in-
troduced notions of entailment, conditional entailment is the
one with the nicest nonmonotonic properties (see Table 2).
In detail, in the given examples, conditional entailment
ignores irrelevant information, shows property inheritance
to nonexceptional subclasses, and respects the principle of
specificity. Moreover, it does not block property inheritance,
and it does not have the drowning problem. Finally, condi-
tional entailment preserves ambiguities and may also handle
purely probabilistic evidence.
The following examples illustrate how conditionally en-
tailed tight intervals are determined.
Example 15 Given T2 of Example 2, we get:
(penguin | ⊤)[1, 1] ‖∼ cetight (legs | ⊤)[.95, 1] .
Here, the interval “[.95, 1]” comes from the tight logical con-
sequence P2 ∪ {(legs ‖ bird)[.95, 1], (fly‖ penguin)[0, .05],
(penguin | ⊤)[1, 1]} |=tight (legs | ⊤)[.95, 1]. ✷
Example 16 Given T5 of Example 5, we get:
(penguin∧ metal wings | ⊤)[1, 1] ‖∼ cetight (fly | ⊤)[0, 1] .
Here, the interval “[0, 1]” is the convex hull of the inter-
vals “[0, .05]” and “[.95, 1]”, which come from the tight log-
ical consequences P5 ∪ {(fly ‖ penguin)[0, .05], (penguin∧
metal wings |⊤)[1, 1]}|=tight(fly | ⊤)[0, .05] and P5∪{(fly ‖
bird)[.95, 1], (fly ‖metal wings)[.95, 1], (penguin ∧ metal
wings | ⊤)[1, 1]} |=tight (fly | ⊤)[.95, 1], respectively. ✷
Relationship to Classical Formalisms
We now analyze the relationship to classical default reason-
ing from conditional knowledge bases and to classical prob-
abilistic reasoning with conditional constraints.
A logical formula is a probabilistic formula that con-
tains only conditional constraints of the kind (ψ|φ)[1,1] or
(ψ‖φ)[1, 1]. A strict logical formula is a strict probabilistic
formula that contains only strict conditional constraints of
the form (ψ|φ)[1, 1]. A logical default theory T is a proba-
bilistic default theory that contains only logical formulas. A
logical knowledge base KB is a strict logical formula.
We use the operator γ on logical formulas, sets of log-
ical formulas, and logical default theories, which replaces
each strict conditional constraint (ψ|φ)[1, 1] (resp., defeasi-
ble conditional constraint (ψ‖φ)[1, 1]) by the classical im-
plication φ⇒ψ (resp., classical default φ→ψ). Given a
logical default theory T , we use |∼ z (resp., |∼ lex , |∼ ce) to
denote the classical notion of z-, (resp., lexicographic, con-
ditional) entailment with respect to γ(T ).
The following result shows that the introduced notions of
z-, lexicographic, and conditional entailment are generaliza-
tions of their classical counterparts.
Theorem 17 Let T =(P,D) be a logical default theory
and let KB be a logical knowledge base. Then, for every
semantics s∈{z, lex , ce}:
KB ‖∼ s(ψ|⊤)[1, 1] iff γ(KB) |∼ sψ.
The next result shows that, when the union of generic
and concrete probabilistic knowledge is satisfiable, the no-
tions of z-, lexicographic, and conditional entailment coin-
cide with the notion of 1-entailment.
Theorem 18 Let T =(P,D) be a probabilistic default the-
ory and let KB be a probabilistic knowledge base such
that P ∪D∪{KB} is satisfiable. Then, for every seman-
tics s∈{z, lex , ce}:
1. KB ‖∼ sF iff P ∪D∪{KB} |= F .
2. KB ‖∼ stight (ψ|φ)[l, u] iff P∪D∪{KB}|=tight(ψ|φ)[l, u].
Summary and Outlook
We presented the notions of z-entailment, lexicographic en-
tailment, and conditional entailment for conditional con-
straints, which combine the classical notions of entail-
ment in system Z , Lehmann’s lexicographic entailment, and
Geffner’s conditional entailment with the classical notion of
logical entailment for conditional constraints. We showed
that the introduced notions for probabilistic default reason-
ing with conditional constraints have similar properties like
their classical counterparts. Moreover, they properly extend
both their classical counterparts and the classical notion of
logical entailment for conditional constraints.
An interesting topic of future research is to extend other
formalisms for classical default reasoning to the probabilis-
tic framework of conditional constraints.
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